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Abstract:
Recent evidence shows that developing and transition economies are increasingly pri-
vatizing their public rms and also experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign di-
rect investment (FDI). In an international mixed oligopoly with strategic tax/subsidy
policies, we analyze the interaction between privatization and FDI. We nd that the
incentive for FDI increases with privatization. However, the possibility of FDI reduces
the degree of privatization. Our paper shows that FDI policies reducing the xed-cost
of undertaking FDI may need to complement the privatization policies to attract FDI
and to improve domestic welfare.
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1 Introduction
Over past two decades, one of the most signicant market reforms in the developing
and transition economies that has helped to attract large foreign direct investment
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(FDI) inows is privatization of their state-owned enterprises (UNCTAD, 2002). While
empirical evidence suggests a negative correlation,1 the literature has only just begun
to address the causality between state ownership and foreign capital.2
Nationalization of rms acts as a disciplining device in an imperfectly competitive
market by increasing output of the state-owned rms. However, as shown in Mukher-
jee and Suetrong (2009), the possibility of FDI a¤ects the incentive for nationalization
signicantly. They show that there can be a two-way relation between FDI and privati-
zation: the incentive for privatization increases the incentive for FDI and the possibility
of FDI increase the foreign rms incentive for FDI. While Mukherjee and Suetrong
(2009) show that FDI and privatization can be complementary, they have ignored an
important aspect, viz., the use of tax/subsidy policies, which can be used to eliminate
(or at least to reduce) ine¢ ciency due to imperfect competition in the product market.
We take up this issue in this paper and use an international oligopoly model to show
the relation between state ownership and FDI in the presence of strategic tax/subsidy
policies.3
We consider an open-economy mixed oligopoly model where a domestic nationalized
rm and a foreign private rm compete in the domestic market with homogeneous
products, which are subject to tax/subsidy imposed by both countries. The foreign
rm decides whether to serve the domestic market either through export or through FDI
and the domestic government determines the optimal degree of private ownership in the
nationalized rm. In line with the privatization literature, discussed in the following
Section 2, and following the practice of many countries, we consider privatization as
transfer of public rms ownership from the government to the investors of the domestic
country.4
1Baer (1994) shows that, as the state ownership in Latin America reduces, the presence of foreign
capital increases. Using annual data of eight Asian and nine Latin American and Caribbean countries
for 1990-99, Gani (2005) shows that privatization is positively correlated to FDI. Focusing on the
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), Marlevede and Schoors (2005) have shown that
privatization history positively a¤ects FDI.
2In a Cournot oligopoly setting, Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009) show that privatization and FDI
are mutually reinforcing.
3Production tax could be in the form of stumpage or natural resources consumption tax - a tax to
help ensure the long run sustainability by making people be more aware of natural resource consump-
tion.
4Before 1996, the auction of shares of the Indian public sector enterprises was restricted to dispersed
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In this framework, we show that privatization generally increases the foreign rms
incentive for FDI. However, when looking at the e¤ects of export and FDI on priva-
tization, we nd that complete privatization is optimal under export by the foreign
rm but partial privatization is optimal if the foreign rm undertakes FDI. Hence, the
threat of FDI reduces the optimal degree of privatization in the presence of taxation.
Whether or not FDI occurs in equilibrium, we nd that partial privatization is the
equilibrium strategy. Our paper shows that FDI policies reducing the xed-cost of
undertaking FDI may need to complement the privatization policies to attract FDI
and to improve domestic welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the relevant literature in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 shows the market outcomes under
export and FDI. Section 5 derives the condition for a protable FDI by the foreign
rm. Section 6 determines optimal degree of privatization. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
The earlier works on privatization focuses on the choice between complete privatization
and complete nationalization as an e¤ective policy tool in a closed-economy framework.
Harris andWiens (1980), Beato andMas-Colell (1984), Cremer et al. (1989) and Barros
(1995) show how a public rm can be used to correct the ine¢ ciencies created by the
imperfectly competitive markets. Since the public rm acts as a disciplining device to
obtain the rst best allocation of outputs, the above mentioned papers are in favour of
complete nationalization.5
Analyzing the implications of privatization under di¤erent market structures, Rees
(1988) and De Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that privatization could also be welfare
enhancing. Fershtman (1990) provides the rationale for privatization in the presence
domestic investors only (Kapur and Ramamurti, 2002). Countries often restrict foreign individuals and
rms from acquiring domestic rms, or apply special restrictions to foreign rms in certain industries,
as is the case in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea (UNCTAD, 2000). Of the 650 major privatization
deals analyzed by Bortolotti et al. (2002) from the Privatization International dataset, only around
HOW MANY involved an equity issue on non-domestic markets.
5See Vickers and Yarrow (1991), Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997) and Pal and White (1998) for
overviews of the privatization literature.
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of cost asymmetry between the rms. Anderson et al. (1997) show that the presence
of the public rm is a source of welfare loss since it deters entry of rms by keeping the
price low. Hence, the benecial e¤ect of entry creates the rationale for privatization in
their analysis.
Matsumura (1998) determines the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly
and shows that, irrespective of the rmscost structures, the public rm should be (at
least partially) privatized except in the case where the private rm cannot enter the
market. Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2012) examine the location choice in a mixed
duopoly when the costs are endogenously determined and nd that the location deci-
sions of the rms are made simultaneously when the objective function of the public
rm has more weight on its prot and sequentially when not. Jain and Pal (2012)
investigate the e¤ects of cross-ownership on optimal privatization, and vice-versa, and
show that cross-ownership is protable to the private rm only if the level of privatiza-
tion of the public rm is su¢ ciently high. However, the possibility of cross-ownership
signicantly limits the socially optimal level of privatization in most of the situations.
All the above-mentioned papers consider privatization in a closed economy. Al-
though these studies have their own merits, they may not be appropriate for economies
with a signicant presence of foreign rms, as considered in our paper.
In a seminal paper, Corneo and Jeanne (1994) consider mixed oligopolies in the
presence of foreign competition. They show that the countries with public rms will
be net exporters. They also show how nationalization and privatization of rms a¤ect
world as well as national welfare.
Other papers that examine privatization and open economies mainly focuses on
the strategic trade policy issues. While Pal and White (1998) investigate the e¤ects
of privatization in the presence of strategic trade policies such as domestic production
subsidies and import tari¤s, Fjell and Heywood (2002) show that the e¤ects of pri-
vatization on rmsoutputs, prots and welfare depend on the number of domestic
and foreign rms. Matsumura et al. (2009) extend Anderson et al. (1997) with for-
eign competition and show that privatization increases (decreases) welfare in the long
(short) run. Lin and Matsumura (2012) show how the presence of foreign investors
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in privatized rms a¤ects privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly and nd that an
increase in the stockholding ratio of foreign investors in a privatized rm increases the
optimal degree of privatization, whereas an increase in the penetration of foreign rms
in product markets reduces it.
Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009) show that privatization of a public rm in the host
country increases a foreign rms incentive for FDI and the presence of FDI generally
gives the government a higher incentive to privatize. However, as mentioned already,
they ignore the tax/subsidy policies which help to reduce the distortion in the product-
market due to imperfect competition. We focus on this issue. Like Mukherjee and
Suetrong (2009), we nd that privatization generally increases the incentive for FDI.
However, unlike them, the possibility of FDI in our analysis reduces the incentive for
privatization.
3 The model
Consider a two-country model with country f , a (developed) foreign country and coun-
try h, a (developing or transition) domestic country. There is a rm in each country
producing a homogeneous good and competing under Cournot competition. Firm p,
located in the domestic country h, is a public (or state-owned) rm and rmm, located
in the foreign country, is a private rm. These rms compete in the domestic country.
Firm m can serve the domestic country either through export or through FDI. Under
export, rm m needs to incur a per-unit transportation cost s. If rm m undertakes
FDI, it needs to invest a xed amount F .6 We assume that the rms face production
tax/subsidies imposed by the respective government conditional on export and FDI by
rm m.
The inverse market demand function in the domestic country is:
P = 1  qm   qp ; (1)
where P is price and qi is the output of rm i; i = p;m, in scenario  = x;R, where
x and R denote export and FDI respectively.
6F captures all the start-up costs of a new plant, including the adjustment cost of learning to
operate in a new institutional and nancial environment.
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We assume that the constant marginal cost of rm p is c < 1. Firm m is more cost
e¢ cient than rm p and has a constant marginal of w < c. For simplicity, we normalize
w to 0. We further assume that
s < c; (2)
i.e. the foreign rm has a marginal cost advantage even under export.
We assume that the outputs of the rms are always positive, which implies that
(see Appendix A):
c < c^  c^(1) = 2
5
: (3)
Let us now consider the objective functions of the rms. While rm m maximizes
prot, the objective function of the (semi) public rm p depends on the rms share
distribution between the government and the private owners of the domestic coun-
try. Following the existing literature,(eg. Matsumura, 1998, Mukherjee and Suetrong,
2010), we assume that rm p maximizes a convex combination of domestic prot and
domestic welfare, where the weights on prots and welfare are given by the fractions
of shareholdings by the domestic-country investors and the domestic government. We
assume that rm p is initially completely nationalized, which means that its objective
is to maximize welfare of the domestic country.
A partially privatized rm p maximizes the following expression
obj = p + (1  )W h ; (4)
where p and W

h are the prot of rm p and welfare of the domestic country respec-
tively in scenario ;  = x;R and  is the degree of privatization. Note that complete
nationalization ( = 0) and complete privatization ( = 1) are the special cases of (4).
As  increases, it reduces the fraction of shareholding by the government and rm p
moves more towards prot maximization.
We consider the following game. In stage one, the domestic country determines
the degree of privatization. In stage two, rm m decides whether to export or to
undertake FDI. In stage three, the governments set the product tax/subsidy rates that
maximize their countrys welfare. In stage four, the two rms set their output levels
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simultaneously7. We solve the game through backward induction.
4 Tax policy
We analyze the third and fourth stages of the game in this section. At stage three,
the governments decide on the strategic tax/subsidy policies and the rms set their
respective output levels at stage four. In subsection 4.1 (4.2), we analyze the subgame
where the foreign rm has decided to export (undertake FDI).
4.1 Export by the foreign rm
In this subgame, the foreign rm has decided to export to the domestic country h. We
start our analysis from stage four where the rms set their output levels simultaneously
to maximize their respective objective functions.
From (1) and (4), the objective function of the domestic rm p is:
objxp = 
 
1  qxm   qxp   txh   c

qxp + (1  )W xh ; (5)
where the domestic countrys welfare W xh consists of rm ps prot, consumer surplus
and tax revenue which is given by:
W xh =
 
1  qxm   qxp   txh   c

qxp +
1
2
(qxp + q
x
m)
2 + txhq
x
p : (6)
The objective of the foreign rm m is to maximize its prots. From (1):
xm =
 
1  qxm   qxp   txf   s

qxm: (7)
We nd that the equilibrium outputs of rms p and m are, respectively:
qxp =
2  2c  + s+ tf   2th
+ 2
; qxm =
c+ + th   s  s  tf   tf
+ 2
(8)
In stage three, the domestic and foreign governments set the respective welfare-
maximizing tax rates subject to qxm and q
x
p given by (8). Maximizing domestic welfare
W xh in (6) with respect to t
x
h and solving for t
x
h we get:
txh =
c  3+ 2c  (tf + s) ( + 1)
3
: (9)
7Our assumption implies that privatization is more irreversible than FDI, which is more irreversible
than tax/subsidy policy and it is more irresible than output decision.
7
The foreign countrys welfare W xf consists of rm ms prot and the tax revenue:
W xf = 
x
m + t
x
f (q
x
m); (10)
where qxm and q
x
p are given by (8) and 
x
m given by (7). Maximizing with respect to t
x
f
yields:
txf =
  (c  s+   s+ th)
2+ 2
: (11)
Solving (9) and (11) for txf and t
x
h yields:
8
txf =  2
c  s
+ 3
< 0 (12)
txh =
  (1  s)2   3 (1  c)+ (c  s)
 (+ 3)
: (13)
Di¤erentiating with respect to ; we see that:
dtxh
d
=   (c  s) 2+ 3
2 + 3
2 (+ 3)2
< 0
dtxf
d
=   6
(+ 3)2
(c  s) < 0:
From (13), we see that the home rm receives subsidy under complete privatization,
and as the degree of privatization decreases, it reduces the subsidy and if the degree
of privatization is small, the home rm faces a tax. The reason for this result is as
follows. If there is complete privatization, the home government wants to sudsidize the
prot maximizing domestic rm to reduce the output market distortion created by the
imperfect competition in the product market. However, as the degree of privatization
reduces, the home rm starts putting more emphasis on welfare maximization, thus
reducing the need for subsidization to eliminate the ine¢ ciency from imperfect com-
petition. If the home rm is signicantly nationalized, the motive for rent extraction
from the foreign rm induces the domestic government to impose a tax on the domestic
rm.
While the domestic rm may receive subsidy or face taxation, the foreign rm
always receives subsidy and the subsidy rate increases with privatization. The rent
8The domestic countrys product tax rate is indeterminate for  = 0: This is because a fully
nationalized rm sees the tax as transferring funds from the rm to the government without a¤ecting
welfare, which is what the rm maximizes. From (5) and (6) with  = 0; t drops out of the rms
objective function: The tax does not a¤ect the rms behavior.
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extraction motive of the foreign government induces it to subsidize the foreign rm,
and this motive gets stronger as the degree of privatization increases, since a higher
degree of privatization increases subsidization by the domestic government.9
Substituting (13) and (12) into (8), we nd the equilibrium output of the domestic
rm as:
qxp =
 2c (+ 2) + (+ 1) s+ (+ 3)
+ 3
(14)
which is decreasing in  as:
dqxp
d
=   2
(+ 3)2
(c  s) < 0: (15)
Substituting (13) and (12) into (8), we nd the equilibrium output of the foreign
rm as:
qxm = 2 (+ 1)
c  s
+ 3
> 0 (16)
which is increasing in  as:
dqxm
d
=
4
(+ 3)2
(c  s) > 0: (17)
Privatization creates two opposing e¤ects on the domestic rms output. On one
hand, it tends to reduce the domestic rms output for a given tax/subsidy, since
privatization reduces the emphasis on welfare maximization. On the other hand, a
higher degree of privatization tends to increase its output by increasing the subsidy
rate. We nd that the rst e¤ect dominates the second e¤ect and a higher degree of
privatization reduces the domestic rms output.
A higher degree of privatization increases the foreign rms output for two reasons.
First, a higher degree of privatization increases subsidization by the foreign government,
which tends to increase the foreign rms output. Second, a higher degree of privatiza-
tion reduces the output of the domestic rm, thus increasing the residual demand for
the foreign rm, which, in turn, helps to increase the foreign rms output.
From (15) and (17), the total output is increasing in :
d
 
qxp + q
x
m

d
=
2 [c  s]
(+ 3)2
> 0: (18)
9The motive for subsidization to extract rent from the rms in competing countries dates back to
seminal work by Brander and Spence (1985).
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The inequality follows from (2) and suggests that the e¤ects of subsidies dominate
the e¤ect of a lower emphasis on welfare in the domestic rm, thus increasing the
total output following privatization. Hence, price falls or consumer surplus increases
with higher . This is in contrast to the general belief that the higher degree of
privatization reduces consumer surplus by encouraging the public rm to move more
towards prot maximization (e.g., see, Mukherjee and Suetrong, 2009). However, this
reasoning ignores strategic tax/subsidy policies. We show that the presence of strategic
tax/subsidy policies may change the e¤ect of privatization on consumers.
Substituting (16), (14) and (12) into the prot function (7), we obtain the prot of
the foreign rm under export as:
xm = 4 (+ 1)
2 (c  s)2
(+ 3)2
: (19)
4.2 FDI by the foreign rm
In this sub-game, the foreign rm has decided, in stage one, to relocate its plant to the
domestic country, i.e. undertaking FDI.
At stage four, each rm sets the output level that maximizes its objective function.
The maximization problem for the domestic rm is:
objR = 
 
1  qRm   qRp   tRh   c

qRp + (1  )WRh :
The domestic countrys welfare WRh consists of rm ps prot, consumer surplus
and tax revenue given by:
WRh =
 
1  qRm   qRp   tRh   c

qRp +
1
2
(qRp + q
R
m)
2 + tRh (q
R
p + q
R
m): (20)
The objective of the foreign rm is to maximize its prots Rm: From (1):
Rm =
 
1  qRm   qRp   tRh

qRm   F: (21)
We nd that the equilibrium outputs of the rms are respectively:
qRp =
2  2c    th
+ 2
; qRm =
c+   th
+ 2
: (22)
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In stage three, the domestic government sets the tax rate that maximizes its welfare
WRh given by (20) with q
R
m and q
R
p given by (22). Maximizing (20) and solving for t
R
h
yields:
tRh =
(c+ + c  2 + c2)
2+ 2 + 3
> 0: (23)
We further see that the tax rate under FDI is rst increasing and then decreasing
with privatization. This is because under full nationalization, the home governments
strategic policy is dominated by the motive for rent extraction from the foreign rm.
Hence, we see that when  = 0; tRh =
c
3
: However, as the degree of privatization
increases, the domestic rm becomes more prot-oriented, thus reducing the emphasis
on welfare, which encourages the government to decrease the tax rate for increasing
consumer surplus.
Substituting (23) into (22), we nd the respective equilibrium outputs of the do-
mestic and the foreign rms as:
qRp =
3  3c    c  c2
2+ 2 + 3
(24)
qRm =
c+ + 2
2+ 2 + 3
: (25)
We see that:
d
 
qRp

d
=
 6  9 + c(3  2) + 2
(2 + 2+ 3)2
: (26)
The sign of the right hand side (RHS) of the above expression depends on the
numerator which is positive for:
c >
1
3  2
  2 + 6+ 9  c0:
We see that RHS of the above expression is increasing in . Setting  = 1 and
considering the maximum value of c from (3), we see that c0 is greater than our maxi-
mum possible value of c, i.e., c^(1) = 2
5
. Hence, RHS of (26) is negative implying that
qRp decreases with privatization. This result is due to the e¤ects of privatization on the
domestic rms lower emphasis on welfare maximization and the e¤ects of privatiza-
tion on the tax rate. Lower emphasis on welfare under privatization helps to reduce
domestic rms equilibrium output. Privatization also increases the tax rate if the de-
gree of privatization is not high, which, in turn, tends to reduce the domestic output.
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Although the tax rate falls when the degree of privatization is high, the signicantly
lower emphasis on welfare due to a large degree privatization dominates the e¤ects of
tax, and privatization reduces the equilibrium output of the domestic rm.
Similarly, di¤erentiating qRm with respect to , we obtain:
dqRm
d
=
(2 + (6  2c)+ (3  2c))
(2 + 2+ 3)2
> 0: (27)
Hence, qRm increases with privatization. With privatization, the domestic rm re-
duces its output, which, in turn, helps to increase the equilibrium output of the foreign
rm. Although the foreign rm faces higher tax rate if the degree of privatization is
not very high, the expansion of foreign rms residual demand following the domes-
tic rms output contraction under privatization dominates the e¤ects of a higher tax
under privatization, and privatization increases the equilibrium output of the foreign
rm.
Combining (26) and (27), it can be shown that the total output (and therefore,
consumer surplus) is generally decreasing in ; increasing only for very high values
of . Higher tax rate and lower emphasis on welfare help to reduce the total output
following privatization if the degree of privatization is not very high. However, a fall
in the tax rate for a very degree of privatization helps to increase the total output
following privatization even if privatization reduces the emphasis on welfare further.
Substituting (24), (25) and (23) into (21), the foreign rms equilibrium prot under
FDI is:
Rm =

(c+ + 2)
(2+ 2 + 3)
2
  F: (28)
5 Export or FDI
Having analyzed the third (government policy) and fourth (rmsoutput) stages of the
game in the previous section, we now move to stage two where the foreign rm decides
between export and FDI. The foreign rm prefers FDI (export) if Rm > ()xm :
Comparing the foreign rms prots (19) under export and (28) FDI, we nd that:
Lemma 1. The foreign rm prefers FDI to export if the xed cost F of undertaking
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FDI is below F^ , where
F^ 

(c+ + 2)
(2+ 2 + 3)
2
 

2 (+ 1)
(c  s)
(+ 3)
2
: (29)
F^ shows the di¤erence between the foreign rms gross prot (i.e. prot including
the relocation cost) under FDI and export, thus showing the foreign rms maximum
gross benet from FDI compared to export. It is worth noting that F^ may be negative,
implying FDI may not occur even if the xed-cost of FDI is zero. F^ has to be positive
for FDI to be protable. It follows from Lemma 1 that:
Proposition 1. The foreign rm prefers FDI to export for low enough relocation
cost F if:
(c+ + 2)
(2+ 2 + 3)
> 2 (+ 1)
(c  s)
(+ 3)
(30)
and this is satised if c > c2; with c2 given as:
c2  (+ 1) 6s+ 3+ 4s + 
2 + 2s2
9+ 62 + 23 + 3
: (31)
Calibrating with di¤erent feasible values of c and s, we see that F^ is increasing
monotonically in  2 [0; 1] : Further, we see that F^ ( = 0) could be negative,10 implying
that the foreign rm could prefer not to undertake FDI under complete nationalization.
However, privatization increases the foreign rms incentive for undertaking FDI.
Since F^ ( = 0) < 0 and F^ is increasing monotonically in  2 [0; 1], there can be a
 in the interval  2 [0; 1] where F = F^ , i.e. rm m is indi¤erent between FDI and
export.
Let us denote by F1 the level of  where rm m is indi¤erent between FDI and
export. By Lemma 1, F1 is dened by:
(c+ F1 + 
2
F1)
(2F1 + 2F1 + 3)
2
+ F =

2 (F1 + 1)
(c  s)
(F1 + 3)
2
: (32)
If F1 exists and  > F1, rm m prefers FDI to export.
10See Appendix D for proof.
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Lemma 2: If there is no F1 2 [0; 1) satisfying (32), rm m exports for all
 2 [0; 1]. If there is a F1 2 [0; 1) satisfying (32), rm m exports for  2 [0; F1] and
undertakes FDI for  2 (aF1; 1].
As the xed-cost of undertaking FDI increases, F1 increases within the range of
 2 [0; 1].
6 Welfare analysis
In this section, we rst analyze the e¤ect of privatization on domestic welfare under
export and FDI by the foreign rm. Then we determine the domestic governments
optimal degree of privatization conditional on the foreign rms location decision.
6.1 Under Export
If the foreign rm exports, domestic welfare is given by (6), where qxp is given by (14),
qxm is given by (16) and t
x
h is given by (13). Substituting the respective values yields:
W xh =
1
2
 
4 (3+ 2 + 3) c2   3s (+ 1)2 (2c  s)  (+ 3)2 (2c  1)
(+ 3)2
(33)
and di¤erentiating it with respect to , we see that welfare is increasing in :
dW 0xh
d
= 6
+ 1
(+ 3)3
(c  s)2 > 0: (34)
Hence, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 2: If the foreign rm exports, complete privatization (i.e. x = 1) is
the optimal policy of the domestic government.
The intuition is as follows. In the absence of strategic trade policy, privatization
creates two e¤ects. On one hand, it tends to increase the prot of the domestic rm.
On the other hand, it tends to decrease consumer surplus. These two e¤ects are similar
to the e¤ects shown in Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009), and make partial privatization
the optimal domestic policy. However, as shown above, in contrast to the above-
mentioned second e¤ect, privatization increases consumer surplus under endogenous
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strategic tax/subsidy policy, thus making complete privatization the optimal domestic
policy under export by the foreign rm.
6.2 Under FDI
If the foreign rm undertakes FDI, domestic welfare is given by (20), where qRp is shown
in (24), qRm is shown in (25) and t
R
h is shown in (23). Domestic welfare under FDI is:
WRh =
1
2
 6c+ 2+ c22   2c  2 + 2c2+ 4c2 + 3
2+ 2 + 3
: (35)
Di¤erentiating the above expression with respect to , we see that:
dWRh
d
=
(c  2+ c) (  c+ 3)
(2 + 2+ 3)2
; (36)
which gives the following result (see Appendix B for the proof):
Proposition 3: If the foreign rm undertakes FDI, the optimal degree of privati-
zation is partial and is equal to:
R =
c
2  c < 1: (37)
In contrast to export by the foreign rm, we have seen that privatization decreases
the total output under FDI except for very high degree of privatization. Hence, in our
analysis, privatization under FDI generally creates a trade o¤ between higher domestic
prot and lower consumer surplus. This trade o¤, which is in contrast to the case
under export but similar to the trade o¤ shown in Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009), is
responsible for creating partial privatization in our analysis under FDI.
The comparison of the degrees of privatization maximizing domestic welfare under
export and FDI by the foreign rm follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3:
R < 

x = 1:
It can also be shown that:11
W xhj=1j > W
R
hj=1j and W
R
hj=0j > W
x
hj=0j: (38)
Lemma 3 If the domestic country privatizes completely, domestic welfare is higher
under export than under FDI. Under complete nationalization, domestic welfare is
higher under FDI than under export.
11See Appendices B and C for the proof.
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6.3 Equilibrium degree of privatization
Now we will determine the optimal degree of privatization conditional on the foreign
rms equilibrium decision on export or FDI. We will consider the following two cases
separately:
(i) When the xed-cost of undertaking FDI is so high that the foreign rm exports
for all values of :
(ii) When the xed-cost of undertaking FDI is intermediate such that R < F1 <
1:12
The optimal degree of privatization for case (i) is immediate from Proposition 1,
showing that complete privatization is the optimal choice of the domestic country.
Hence, we concentrate on case (ii) in the following analysis.
In case (ii), privatization can induce the foreign rm to switch from export to FDI
(F1 < 1 in (32)). However, since welfare under FDI is decreasing in  for  > R, it
is not immediate whether the domestic government will prefer to privatize to attract
FDI. We have to see whether welfare at F1 is higher (as illustrated in Figure 1) or
lower (as illustrated in Figure 2) under FDI compared to export.
A
B
a
0
W
1*Ra
x
hW
R
hW
1Fa
Figure 1: Figure 1: FDI under optimal privatization policy
Figure 1 considers the case where welfare at F1 is higher under FDI than under
12We show in Appendix E that R < F1.
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export. In this case, rm m exports until F1 and domestic welfare at F1 under
export by the foreign rm is given by point A on W xh . If the degree of privatization is
more than F1, rm m undertakes FDI and domestic welfare follows the curve WRh for
 > F1. Since domestic welfare is higher under FDI than under export at F1, the
degree of privatization that maximizes domestic welfare conditional on FDI by rm m
is given by F1 + ", where "! 0, which is just su¢ cient to induce the foreign rm to
undertake FDI. Hence, due to the rm ms strategic plant location decision, F1 + "
is the optimal degree of privatization and neither R, since rm m does not undertake
FDI at R, nor 

x = 1, since rm m does not export at 

x = 1.
Now consider the situation where F1 > R and domestic welfare at F1 is higher
under export than under FDI by rm m, as shown in Figure 2. Similar to the previous
case, the domestic country would try to attain the highest possible welfare conditional
on rm ms plant location decision. Since rm m undertakes FDI for  > F1, the
domestic government privatizes up to F1, which deters FDI and induces rm m to
export. Note that domestic welfare is maximized at  = 1 if rm m exports at  =
1. However, since  = 1 induces rm m to undertake FDI, the optimal degree of
privatization is F1. Therefore, the threat of FDI encourages the domestic government
to privatize partially, although FDI does not occur in equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows that privatization along with the FDI policies to reduce the xed-
cost of undertaking FDI is required to attract FDI and to improve domestic welfare.
If the FDI policy of the domestic country helps to reduce the xed-cost of undertaking
FDI, thus reducing F1, it may create a situation like Figure 1, where FDI occurs and
domestic welfare is higher compared to the situation in Figure 2.
The following result is immediate from Propositions 2 and 3 and the above discus-
sion.
Proposition 4: If the cost of undertaking FDI is such that the foreign rm exports
up to F1 < 1, the optimal degree of privatization is either F1+" (if domestic welfare
at F1 is higher under FDI than under export) or F1 (if domestic welfare at F1 is
lower under FDI than under export). Hence, the credible threat of FDI by the foreign
rm reduces the degree of privatization.
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Figure 2: Export under optimal privatization policy.
The reason for the above result is easy to understand. For a given degree of pri-
vatization, on one hand, more cost e¢ ciency under FDI (compared to export) due to
the transport cost saving tends to increase domestic welfare, but on the other hand,
FDI tends to reduce domestic welfare by reducing domestic prot. If the threat of FDI
is credible, meaning that the foreign rm undertakes FDI for a degree of privatization
that is less than 1, the negative e¤ect of FDI on domestic prot reduces the domes-
tic governments incentive for privatization compared to the situation where FDI does
not occur for any degree of privatization. However, whether the domestic government
wants FDI depends on the strengths of the negative e¤ect of FDI on domestic prot
and the positive cost e¢ ciency e¤ect. If the former e¤ect is stronger, the domestic
government wants to privatize in a way that maximizes domestic welfare conditional
on no FDI by the foreign rm. If the domestic rms prot loss is less important, the
domestic government wants to attract FDI through privatization, yet the degree of
privatization must be less than the degree of privatization when FDI is not an option,
since FDI reduces the domestic welfare by shifting prot from the domestic rm to the
foreign rm.
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7 Conclusion
We show the interaction between privatization and FDI in the context of strategic
tax/subsidy policies. Privatization by the domestic country increases a foreign rms
incentive for FDI. However, the threat of FDI reduces the optimal degree of privatiza-
tion compared to the situation with no FDI. Although complete privatization is optimal
when FDI is not an option, partial privatization is optimal if FDI is a credible option.
Whether the domestic government prefers FDI in equilibrium depends on the trade-o¤
created by the negative e¤ect of the domestic rms prot loss and the positive e¤ect
of cost e¢ ciency. If the domestic prot loss is signicant, the domestic country prefers
no FDI in equilibrium. In this situation, the privatization policy is designed to prevent
FDI. However, if the loss in prot for the domestic rm is not signicant, the domestic
government privatizes up to the point that is just enough to induce FDI. Thus, we
show that although privatization increases the incentive for FDI, the credible threat
of FDI decreases the incentive for privatization, which is in contrast to the literature
on privatization and FDI in the absence of strategic tax/subsidy policies (Mukherjee
and Suetrong, 2009). Whether or not FDI occurs in equilibrium, we nd that partial
privatization is the equilibrium strategy.
There are, however, some important remarks to be made. We have abstracted in
our analysis from other important factors that are relevant in the current world trade
scenario. We have considered a non-polluting industry. However, the relationship
between state ownership and FDI in the presence of environmental pollution is often
considered to be important as FDI is often considered to be a source of environmental
degradation in the host countries.13 However, similar results can be obtained when the
model is extended to include environmental pollution as a by-product of production.14
In this case as well, privatization by the domestic country increases a foreign rms
incentive for FDI and the threat of FDI reduces the optimal degree of privatization
compared to the situation of no FDI. The damage from pollution creates a further
e¤ect on privatization. If the damage from pollution is signicant, the domestic country
13See Kellenberg (2009) for a survey of the literaure on environmental regulation and FDI.
14Details are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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prefers no FDI in equilibrium. In this situation, the privatization policy is designed
to prevent FDI. However, if the damage from pollution is not signicant, the domestic
government privatizes up to the point that is just enough to induce FDI.
We have also assumed in our analysis that there is either no demand for the product
in the foreign country or the foreign rm is always a monopolist in the foreign market.15
Hence, any change in the domestic country does not a¤ect the outcome in the foreign
country. A signicant extension of this model would be to investigate the robustness
of the model when introducing market demand in the foreign country. However, if
there is demand in both the markets and the domestic rm p can export to the foreign
market, the subsidies would be further higher due to the rent extraction motive of the
governments. In this case, the optimal degree of privatization would increase. However,
if rm p could relocate to the foreign country, either to serve the foreign market only
or to serve both the markets through re-exporting, the strategic FDI and privatization
decisions would be di¤erent. We leave this issue for future research.
15High cost needed to serve the foreign market may prevent the domestic rm from entering the
foreign market. Das et al. (2007) show that there is a signicant xed cost of exporting. Moreover,
buyer-seller networks may be important for both international trade and investment (Greaney, 2003),
and high network costs may prevent the foreign rm in the model from serving the export markets.
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8 Appendix
Appendix A: Maximum value of c:
We see from (14) and (24) that qxp and q
R
p are positive respectively for:
c < c(; s)  1
2+ 4
(s+ + s+ 3) ; (A.1)
c < c^()  3  
+ 2 + 3
: (A.2)
We further see that:
@c(; s)
@
< 0 and
dc^()
d
< 0: (A.3)
Following (A.3), the least possible values of (A.1) and (A.2) are respectively:
c < cmin  c(1; s) = s+ 2
3
(A.4)
c < c^min  c^(1) = 2
5
: (A.5)
Comparing (A.4) and (A.5), we see that c^(1) < c(1; s): Hence, the relevant con-
straint is (3).
Appendix B: WRh as a function of :
Di¤erentiating domestic welfare WRh under FDI in (35) partially with respect to ;
we see that there are two solutions to @WRh =@ = 0; which we call  and 

R:
 = c  3; R =
c
2  c: (A.6)
We see that 0 < R < 1 and  is negative.
In order to determine whether these two stationary points are maxima or minima,
we di¤erentiate partially with respect to  again:
d2
 
WRh

d2

=
=
1
 4c+ c2 + 6 > 0;
d2
 
WRh

d2

=R
=  1
4
(c  2)4
c2   4c+ 6 < 0:
Hence, domestic welfare reaches a global maximum for  2 [0; 1] at  = R as given
by (A.6).
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Appendix C: WRh is not higher than W
x
h for  = 1:
Setting  = 1 in (35) we get the domestic welfare under FDI at  = 1 as:
WRhj=1j =
7c2   8c+ 4
12
: (A.7)
Similarly setting  = 1 in (33), we get domestic welfare under export at  = 1 as:
W xmaxhj=1j =
(7c2   8c+ 4)  s (3) (2c  s)
8
: (A.8)
From (A.7) and (A.8), we see that:
d
 
W xh  WRh

j=1j
dc
=   1
12
(7c+ 9s  4) < 0:
The minimum value of
 
W xh  WRh

j=1j is at the maximum value that c can take.
From (A.7), (A.8) and the maximum value of c given by (3), we see that: 
W xh  WRh

j=1jcmax
=
1
200
  60s+ 75s2 + 16 > 0:
Thus, we see that
W xhj=1j > W
R
hj=1j
at  = 1: Also, setting  = 0;in (33) and (35) we see that:
WRh  W xh

=0
=
1
6
s (2c  s) > 0:
Appendix D: F^ could be negative at  = 0:
Substituting  = 0 into (31), we see that F^ > 0 at  = 0 for:
c > c  2s: (A.10)
Thus, we see that when c < c, F^ is negative at  = 0.
Appendix E: R < aF1:
If R > aF1; it implies from (29) that F^ should be positive at  = 

R  c2 c :
We see from (29) that F^=R > 0 for:
c >c  1
2
p
16s+ 1  1
2
: (A.11)
However, for this to be consistent with the model setting, c should be less than c^
in (3). On comparison from (A.11) and (3), we see that c < c^ for s < 0:14: Thus, for
cases where s < 0:14; we see that R > aF1:
22
References
[1] Anderson, S.P., A.d. Palma and J-F. Thisse (1997), Privatization and e¢ ciency
in a di¤erentiated industry, European Economic Review, 41: 1635-54.
[2] Baer, W. (1994), Privatization in Latin America, The World Economy, 17: 509-
28.
[3] Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1985), Export subsidies and international market
share rivalry, Journal of International Economics, 18: 83-100.
[4] Bárcena-Ruiz , J. and F. Casado-Izaga, 2012. "Location of public and private rms
under endogenous timing of choices," Journal of Economics, 105: 129-143.
[5] Barros, F (1995), Incentive schemes as strategic variables: an application to a
mixed duopoly, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13: 373-86.
[6] Beato, P. and A. Mas-Colell (1984), The marginal cost pricing rule as a regulation
mechanism in mixed markets, in: Marchand, M., P. Pestieau and H. Tulkens
(eds.), The performance of public enterprises, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[7] Bortolotti, B., M. Fantini and C. Scarpa ( 2002), Why do governments privatize
abroad?, International Review of Finance, 3: 121-63.
[8] Corneo, G. and Jeanne, O. (1994), Oligopole mixte dans un marché commun,
Annales dEconomie et de Statistique, ENSAE, 33: 73-90.
[9] Cremer, H., M. Marchand and J-F. Thisse (1989), The public rm as an in-
strument for regulating an oligopolistic market, Oxford Economic Papers, 41:
283-301.
[10] Das, S., M.J. Roberts and J.R. Tybout (2007), Market entry costs, producer
heterogeneity and export dynamics, Econometrica, 75: 837-73.
[11] De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono (1989), Alternative strategies of a public enterprise
in oligopoly, Oxford Economic Papers, 41: 302-11.
23
[12] Fershtman, C. (1990), The interdependence between ownership status and market
structure: The case of privatization, Economica, 57: 319-28.
[13] Fjell, K. and J. S. Heywood (2002), Public Stackelberg leadership in a mixed
oligopoly with foreign rms, Australian Economic Papers, 41: 267-81.
[14] Gani, A. (2005), Foreign direct investment and privatization, USPEC Working
Paper, No. 2005/6, Department of Economics, University of The South Pacic.
[15] Greaney, T.M. (2003), Reverse importing and asymmetric trade and FDI: a net-
works explanation, Journal of International Economics, 61: 453-465.
[16] Harris, R.G., and E.G. Wiens (1980), Government enterprise: an instrument for
the internal regulation of industry, Canadian Journal of Economics, 13: 125-32.
[17] Jain, R. and Pal, R. (2012), Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privati-
zation,Journal of Economics, 107: 45-70.
[18] Kapur, D. and R. Ramamurti (2002), Privatization in India: the imperatives
and consequences of gradualism, in: Srinivasan, T.N. (ed.), India After a Decade
of Economic Reforms: Retrospect and Prospects, Stanford University Press.
[19] Kellenberg, D.K. (2009), An empirical investigation of the pollution haven e¤ect
with strategic environment and trade policy, Journal of International Economics,
78: 242-255.
[20] Merlevede, B. and K. Schoors, (2005), How to catch foreign sh? FDI and acces-
sion countries, Working Paper, No. 785, William Davidson Institute.
[21] Matsumura, T. (1998), Partial privatization in mixed duopoly, Journal of Public
Economics, 70: 473-83.
[22] Matsumura, T. and O. Kanda (2005), Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets,
Journal of Economics, 84: 27-48.
24
[23] Matsumura, T., N. Matsushima, N. and I. Ishibashi (2009), Privatization and
entries of foreign enterprises in a di¤erentiated industry, Journal of Economics,
98: 203-219.
[24] Matsumura, T. and Lin, M.H (2012), Presence of Foreign Investors in Privatized
Firms and Privatization Policy, Journal of Economics, 107: 71-80.
[25] Mukherjee, A. and K. Suetrong (2009), Privatization, strategic foreign direct
investment and host-country welfare, European Economic Review, 53: 775-785.
[26] Pal, D. and M.D. White (1998), Mixed oligopoly, privatization, and strategic
trade policy, Southern Economic Journal, 65: 264-81.
[27] Rees, R. (1998), Ine¢ ciency, Public Enterprise and Privatisation, European Eco-
nomic Review, 32: 422-431.
[28] Schmidt, K.M. and M. Schnitzer (1997), Methods of privatization: auctions, bar-
gaining and give-aways, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 1541.
[29] UNCTAD (2000), World Investment Report, United Nations, New York and
Geneva.
[30] UNCTAD (2002), World Investment Report, United Nations, New York and
Geneva.
[31] Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow, (1991), Economic perspectives on privatization, Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 5: 111-32.
25
